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Abstract 
The burden of this paper is to critique Robert Nozick’s entitlement 
theory of justice which was drafted as an argument against 
traditional distribution theories. Nozick’s theory of justice claims 
that whether a distribution is just or not depend entirely on how it 
came about. By contrast, justice according to equality, need, desert 
or Rawl’s Difference principle depends entirely on the “pattern” of 
distribution. He objected to these patterned distribution due to their 
deficiencies. To this he propounded the entitlement theory which is 
primarily concerned with respecting people’s rights, especially, their 
rights to property and their rights to self-ownership. Entitlement 
theory of justice involves three ideas; justice in acquisition, justice in 
transfer, and rectification of injustice. Most political philosophers 
rejected Nozick’s entitlement perspective, for its shaky foundation 
and lack of practical relevance. This paper  therefore attempts to 
inquire into Nozick’s theory to highlight some of  the percieved 
strenghts, defects, inconsistencies and hidden fallacies and to offer 
some remedial solutions where necessary. We then conclude that 
through affirmative action and his rectification criteria that his 
philosophy is still relevant in   our contemporary world.  
 
Introduction 
 Robert Nozick is a Havard professor with wide-ranging 
interest and one of the most influential political philosophers, along 
with John Rawls, on the Anglo- American tradition (Fesser , 2003). 
His first and most celebrated book, “Anarchy State and Utopia” 
produced a revival of the discipline of social and political 
philosophy in the analytic school. There has in the years been no 
sustained and completely argued challenge to the prevailing 
conception of social justice and the role of the state than with the 
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arrival of Nozick’s work. In the light of his entitlement theory of 
justice, Nozick was  critical of  John Rawl’s difference principle. As 
for  Rawl, his difference principle captures – the idea of a fair 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social co-operation. 
Nozick challenges the view that the difference principle  represent 
fair terms of social co-operation on three grounds. First of all, the 
idea that talents are somehow common property, diminishes the 
“dignity and self-respect of autonomous being’’  because it 
“attributes everything noteworthy about the person to certain sorts 
of “external factor.” Secondly, Nozick challenges the Rawlsian 
assumption that a person’s endowments are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view, because we can be entitled to something without us 
deserving to have it. Thus a person may be entitled to his talents 
without deserving them. Thirdly, using the better-off to benefit the 
worst–off is to violate the Kantian injunction never to use people as 
means but always as ends. This led him to propound a theory of 
distributive and private property in attempt to describe “justice in 
holding” (Nozick, 1974:150) or what can be said about and done 
with the property people own when viewed from a principle of 
justice. There are three aspects to this, which are: 
(a) a principle of justice in acquisition- which is an initial 
acquisition of holding. It is an account of how people first 
came to own property, what types of things can be held and 
so forth. 
(b) A principle of justice in transfer- which is how one person 
can acquire holdings from another, including voluntary 
exchange and gifts. 
(c) A principle of rectification of injustice- which is how to deal 
with holdings that are unjustly acquired or transffered, 
whether and how much victims can be compensated, how to 
deal with long past transgressions or injustices done by a 
government, and so on. 
 Nozick believes that if the world were wholly just, only the 
first two principles would be needed, as “the following inductive 
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definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in 
holdings. 
A) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
B) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in transfer, from someone else is entitled 
to the holding. 
C)  No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) 
application of 1 and 2 (Nozick 1974:151) 
 Unfortunately, not everyone follows these rules, “some people steal 
from others or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product 
and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude 
others from competing in exchanges”. (ibid:152). Thus the third 
principle of rectification is needed. 
 Self ownership is the cornerstone of Nozick’s work. It is from this 
source that the right of the individual and the minimal state 
originate.   
From the above exposition, the strenghts and the weakneses 
of Nozick’s entitlement theory are apparent. This paper therefore 
attempts to inquire into Nozick’s theory to highlight some of these 
perceived strengths, defects, inconsistencies and hidden fallacies and 
to offer some remedial solutions where necessary. Then know how 
consistent and relevant his philosophy is to our contemporary world.  
 
Exposition of the Entitlement Theory Justice in Acquisition 
 According to this theory, a possession is justly held if it was 
acquired in a just fashion. But it says nothing about the process of 
initial appropriation, however. To this, Nozick appeals to the 
“Lockean proviso”, such that an individual can legitimately claim 
possession of the natural world. For according to locke: 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that 
nature have provided, and left in, he hath mixed his 
labor with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by 
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him removed from the commonal, state of nature 
hath placed it in, it hath by this labor something 
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of 
other men: for this labor being the unquestionable 
property of the laborer, no man but he can have a 
right to what that is once joined to, at least where 
there is enough, and as good, left in common for 
others. (Locke, Ch.5, sec.27) 
There are serious questions that can be asked concerning Nozick’s 
theory of justice in initial acquisition. Like, “What is original 
acquisition”? asks Palmer (2005:358) Adam’s and Eve’s? He 
observes that most current holdings are historically traceable to 
items that were once the spoils of war or of other forms of removal 
by force or intimidation. He says:  
My country was once the territory of the Miwork 
Indians. I don’t know if the miworks wrested this 
land from anearlier prehistoric people, but I do 
know that the Miwoks did not simply bestow the 
land on the European settlers who are my ancestors. 
(ibid) 
Equally the same generalization will be made that the first American 
colonialst had no legitimate claim to the land that they either through 
violence or conned whole population out with unquestionably unfair 
trades (such as the infamous beads-for Manhattan transfer) 
The same problem is also raised by American’s history of slavery. It 
can be once again generalized that for over two hundred years, 
citizens of the United States as a whole benefited from the 
subjugation of the entire race. The labor being exercised (the slaves) 
was not that of those who benefitted (the slave owners), and thus no 
legitimate claims can be made to any of the fruits of that labor. And 
because they benefits of this ill-gotten labor were spread even to 
those who did not condone slavery, the legacy of slavery is 
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essentialy one of blood money, staining the hands of all involved 
and so not justly acquired. 
From here we can conclude that Nozick’s just acquisitions 
seem untenable, especially in the way that he establishes that 
acquisition must be gained. The question is that in today’s world, 
does anybody have just entitlement to her or his property derivable 
from original acquisition? Cohen (1995) noted that as long as 
historical injustices are unresolved, Nozick’s entire position on right 
and minimal state is rendered nigh invalid. As noted, historical 
injustice violates property rights. If property rights are allowed to 
remain comprised, then there is no moral objection to further 
infringing property rights- for instance, through taxation. The 
minimal state would cease to be the most extensive state that can be 
justified, then a Rawlsian welfare state or Hobbesian Leviathan 
would be made morally justifiable. 
 Since the principle of justice in acquisition of property 
affirms very strong property rights. In Nozick’s view every 
individual is entitled to sell or use their natural endowment willingly 
or as they might please. There is however a slight problem because 
he does not come up clearly on the foundation of the same property 
rights. The clearest issue is the fact that he does not base this to the 
right to life and there is no utilitarian foundation (Goldsmith; 2006). 
Critiques therefore argue that Nozick does not provide a persuasive 
foundation that explains much about private property. 
 Vargas (2010), observed that the most significant 
shortcoming of the entitlement theory is that it is a construction 
without any foundation ….as it is, it has very little, if any practical 
value. He also noted that instead of providing an original principle of 
justice in acquisition, Nozick refer his to Locke’s theory of property. 
By doing so, he inherits all the weaknesses of the lockean theory of 
property. This is particularly important since if the principle of the 
theory in acquisition is flawed, the entire entitlement theory 
collapses, because this principle constitutes the foundation of all 
kinds of entitlement to holdings.  
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If we are to go by Nozick’s theory of justice in acquisition, there 
is no parameter to measure original/initial acqusitions, the sources of 
what we presently use are unknown, so do we go about asking for 
the justification of our holdings. It could be embarrasing to go from 
person to person asking for the authenticity of our holding. Some of 
our holdings were inherited either from our fathers and grand 
fathers, so there is no way to know whether they were justly 
acquired or not. I suggest that conscience should dictate our 
acquisition of holdings because going by Nozick’s model will result 
to chaos and anarchy in property acquisition. 
 
Principles of Justice in Transfer 
 Under justice in transfer, it states that whatever is justly held 
can be freely transferred. Again he used Locke’s principle to justify 
this, for according to Locke:  
Again, if he would give his nuts for a price of metal, 
pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for 
shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond , 
and keep those by him all his life he invade not the 
right of others , he might heap up as much these 
durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the 
bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness 
of his possessions, but the perishing of anything 
uselessly in it. (Locke: Second treatise on 
Government, Sec. 46)  
(The notion of ‘free” in this case would seem to mean freedom from 
force, theft, fraud and so on). Philosophers were critical on Nozick’s 
assumption that just situations result from just actions. A 
philosopher like Chia (2010), considers a case where an individual 
willingly sells himself or herself into slavery. Here, no justice in 
transfer was violated but in effect the free individual (an end) is 
subsumed as a means, and self ownership violated. Nozick’s tale of 
the slave, where the slave has a plethora of rights and benefits but 
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not freedom is still amorally unacceptable position. This according 
to Chia shows that Nozick’s model does not necessarily remain just 
in all cases. 
Also, the concept of justice implies that there should be no 
prohibition between capitalist actions between two or more 
consenting adults. He noted that there are usually some community 
concerns in situations where say a husband commits adultery with 
someone’s wife. As long as there was no force used, then there is 
nothing unjust in this situation in Nozick’s view. 
Nozick argues that before a holding could be justly transffered it has 
to be justly acquired. He builds on the theory of appropriation 
created by John Locke. This theory explains how a person could 
own property right for an unowned by the mere fact that he 
contributes his labour. Nozick, however changes this a little by 
stating that appropriation can never be justified if the condition of 
others are no longer at liberty to use the same property would be 
made worse by appropriation.  For instance, a call centre company is 
bought by a mobile service company and the workers of the call 
centre company are sent packing, then this could not be considered a 
just acquisition. Chia (2010) observes that this is because the 
financial condition of the former workers who is no longer at liberty 
to benefit from the call centre will deteriorate. It can only be just if 
the employees are still retained to work in the same company 
although under different employer. 
Another criticism leveled against justice in transfer was that 
it was not systematically delineated by Nozick. The accumulation of 
wealth is said to lead to acquisition of power that might express or 
manifest liberty. This implies that it is not socialism that actually 
restricts liberty, rather it is capitalism. Goldsmith (2006) states that 
critics add that capitalism would lead to exploitation of labour 
making acquisition of wealth even more unjust. For instance in the 
society, the rich normally have more to say than the poor. This 
means that it is because of their wealth that they gain the bargaining 
power to control the poor. A poor man will therefore work in a steel 
industry for a very little pay that could not even be equated to the 
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kind of work he does because he has no alternative. The rich man on 
the other hand would kick him out if he keeps complaining because 
there are still many more people looking for the same job. Inother 
words, the rich man has nothing to loose. However, Nozick counters 
this by arguing that as long as the arrangement is voluntary and not 
forced, there is absolutely no injustice in that. 
Nozick insistence that whatever that is justly acquired can be 
justly transferred is not true in all cases. A situation where one justly 
acquired a certificate either as a lawyer, doctor or engineer, he is not 
justified to transfer it to another person. Equally for me, Nozick’s 
justice in transfer seems to justify slavery to an extent. For example, 
a father can justifiably sell his son to slavery because he is a 
justifiable possession and can part with him. 
 
Rectification of Injustice 
 This third theory theory states that if the current distribution 
of holdings are the result of unjust acquisition, then a distribution 
which would have arisen had the transaction been just must be 
rectified. Nozick (1974:231) says “that although to introduce 
socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past 
injustices might be so great as to make neccesary in the short run a 
more extensive state inorder to rectify them”. 
This according to Cohen (1995) if the current distribution of 
property holdings are as the result of unjust acquisitions, then a 
distribution which would have arisen had the transaction been just 
must be realised. The simplest way of putting this idea, is that if A 
unjustly acquire X from B, and then A may (if necessary) be 
compelled to restore X to B. The idea can be made more precise: to 
the extent that A has illegitimately worsened the situation of B, 
rectification is accomplished If A brings it about that B is no worse 
off, given the actions done with a view of rectification, than B would 
have been had the injustice not occurred in the first place. 
Narveson  remarked that this is a tall order, and not easily 
accomplished in a wide variety of cases. Indeed, in conspicuously 
important cases, it is impossible, for in those cases, B is dead and 
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nothing whatever can be done to make B in particular better off than 
he is now. And in numerous other cases as well, rectification would 
no doubt be very difficult. The fact, that rectification is often 
difficult or even impossible, is said by many writers, and evidently 
also thought by Nozick himself, to be a major problem for Nozick 
theory.  
Another important pertinent question to ask is, how far back 
should we go when deciding to rectify these injustices? Cowen 
(2002) in an attempt to this question noted that the Hopis charge that 
their lands were stolen from them by the Navajo. If the United States 
government returns land to the Navajos, should it also return some 
Navajo property to the Hopi? Equally in the post- communist and 
transition economies, should it also return some Navajo property to 
the Hopi? Should it matter that the nobles virtually enslaved the 
Russian peasantry? Should it matter that the Ghenghis Khan sacked 
Baghdad in 1258? 
He concurs with our earlier submission that everyone living 
today, if they go back far enough can find ancestors who were 
oppressed and victimised. Also subsequent corporate assets have 
been built on stolen lands or generated by investments on originally 
stolen land endowments. So the choice of time horizon for 
rectification becomes important to the extent we compound past 
losses at positive interest.  
Judging by Nozick’s rectification criteria, few current land 
titles would satisfy it because it is obviously impractical and almost 
certainly unjust to redistribute all the world’s land. Ignorance of 
previous transgressions offers no escape here. We would not wish to 
overturn all current land titles, even if we knew exactly who had 
stolen what from whom. 
Another criticism leveled against Nozick’s rectification is on 
the account of resource constraints limiting the sum available for 
restitution. If oppression destroys economic value, the sum total of 
claims may exceed the resources available for rectification.  
In the former soviet Union, there is not nearly enough to give 
everyone“what they would have had’, had Lenin instituted liberal 
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capitalist democracy, nor can ex-dictator of Haiti give back all the 
economic value they have destroyed, or even a sizeable fraction 
there-of. 
According to some estimates, the total national wealth of 
Hungary was not greater than the value of the assets confiscated 
from Hungarian Jews during the second world war. (Pogany 
1997;177). 
 In sports especially football, Newey (2009) opined that there 
has been a collateral damage from footballing injustices, such as 
England’s defeat by west Germany in the 1970 tournament. The 
wessies winning strike always looked a bit suspect, with Gerald 
Muller’s leg well up. Since rectification is the putting right of past 
wrong, would Thiery Henry’s hand ball in France’s world cup 
qualifier against Ireland offer a mass exercise in rectificatory justice, 
with many in the republic calling for the game to be replayed? The 
Irish know what they are talking about, having recently had to take 
the Lisbon Treaty referenduum to a replay inorder to get the right 
result. FIFA has spoils sportingly turned down the Irish FA’s pleas. 
Newey contended that if rectification were to be carried out in 
football, why stop with Henry’s handball?  Why not rectify other 
injustices of footballing injustice like the Maradonna’s “hand of 
God’s goal” for Argentina against England in the 1986 world cup.  
Critiques now argued that if the match should be replayed 
would some players who are tired and retired come out of 
retirement. Would they be replaced by cardboard cut-outs or by 
some of the surviving substitutes?  Does this mean that those who 
watched those matches are to go back to the stadium and watch the 
match replayed, take autographs and redo the events of that day 
before justice is realized. This is the problem we are faced with 
Nozick’s rectification of injustice, because we have to return the 
situation in “statusquo ante bellum.” 
 How and where do we begin to rectify these injustices? 
What of those who we are in possession of their holdings but don’t 
know their whereabout again? how do we go about  looking for 
them? What of those who have long died? Do we return the 
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properties to their children who were not there during the “taking”? 
Will it not result to an unjust acquisition from the children, which 
Nozick vehemently opposed? 
However, Nozick’s model  call for the rectification of these 
past transgressions of indigenous property rights is not outrightly 
untenable.  This is currently achieved in some cases through fiscal 
compensation or affirmative action schemes. 
 Charles J. Ogletree in “the case for Affirmative Action” remarks 
that after centuries of bias, we stand by policies that redress past 
wrong (rectification of injustices)
.
He made this assertion because of 
the help he got through affirmation policies. His dreams became 
reality as a result affirmative policies in Stanford education. To this 
he wrote:
 
My father, who grew up in Birmingham, Ala, and 
my mother, a native of little Rock, Ark, never 
finished high school. They grew in a segregated 
South that offered few opportunities and many 
obstacles for African Americans. I grew up in 
Merced, Calif, in an environment where many of my 
peers viewed merely staying alive and getting a job 
as a successful course in life. But, with a push from 
my parents, I was determined to be the first in my 
family to attend college. With help from high school 
counselors, I discovered Stanford. And thanks to an 
aggressive, minority out reach program by the 
admission office, I was given the opportunity of a 
first rate education. Without Affirmative action, I 




 Nozick’s rectification of injustice will be readily useful in 
Nigeria where corruption has eaten deep into the fabrics of the 
Nation’s marrow. Having explored all options to tackle corruption 
and non seems to yield any tangible result. I believe that the 
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rectification theory of Nozick will offer the most needed help. So 
that before one is cleared of any corruption charge especially 
embezzlement of the public coffer, he must have restituted all he had 
stolen both during and after he left office. 
 
Conclusion 
 We have seen that Nozick’s theory is based on three key 
principles. Nozick put forward the claim that, inorder to deserve 
something, a person must be entitled to it according to the principle 
of justice in acquisition, the principle of justice in transfer, or the 
principle of rectification. However, he does not tell us what these 
principles actually consist of. Consequently this lack much of the 
value it could have had if it had been more complete. Instead of 
providing an original principle of justice in acquisition, Nozick 
refers us to Locke’s theory of property. By doing so, he inherits all 
the weaknesses of the Lockean theory of property. This is 
particularly important since, if the principle of the theory in 
acquisition is flawed, the entire entitlement theory collapses, because 
this principle constitutes the foundation of all kinds of entitlement to 
holding. In turn, Nozick completely ignores the principle of justice 
in transfer. How can we know when it is just to transfer holdings 
from one person to another? The entitlement theory provides no 
answer to that question, other than suggesting that people are free to 
transmit their holdings to others if they wish to do so. The only 
principle sufficiently explained, the rectification principle, relies on 
the other two in order to acquire any meaning, so if the other two 
principles are void so is the rectification principle. How far shall we 
go to rectify these injustices? What parameter do we use measure to 
measure the quantity of what to rectify of what happened decades 
back. What of those that have benefited from those injustices? Do 
we term it an unjust acquisition? We have seen that Nozick’s 
entitlement theory is not entirely problematic but useful in fiscal 
compensation and affirmative action.  
 Overall, the entitlement theory as it has been put forward by 
Robert Nozick feels incomplete,  like a law which has a defined 
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structure but does not have actual legal disposition inside it to give it 
real meaning. These not withstanding, Nozick’s theory has delighted 
a number of people whose political posture is decidedly to the right. 
But most of the literature that his book has inspired has been critical. 
It as if political writers see Nozick’s arguments as important enough 
to require as important enough to require a response. 
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